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Typically, fair machine learning research focuses on a single deci-
sion maker and assumes that the underlying population is station-
ary. However, many of the critical domains motivating this work
are characterized by competitive marketplaces with many decision
makers. Realistically, we might expect only a subset of them to
adopt any non-compulsory fairness-conscious policy, a situation
that political philosophers call partial compliance. This possibility
raises important questions: how does partial compliance and the
consequent strategic behavior of decision subjects affect the allo-
cation outcomes? If 𝑘% of employers were to voluntarily adopt a
fairness-promoting intervention, should we expect 𝑘% progress (in
aggregate) towards the benefits of universal adoption, or will the
dynamics of partial compliance wash out the hoped-for benefits?
How might adopting a global (versus local) perspective impact the
conclusions of an auditor? In this paper, we propose a simple model
of an employment market, leveraging simulation as a tool to ex-
plore the impact of both interaction effects and incentive effects on
outcomes and auditing metrics. Our key findings are that at equilib-
rium: (1) partial compliance by𝑘% of employers can result in far less
than proportional (𝑘%) progress towards the full compliance out-
comes; (2) the gap is more severe when fair employers match global
(vs local) statistics; (3) choices of local vs global statistics can paint
dramatically different pictures of the performance vis-a-vis fairness
desiderata of compliant versus non-compliant employers; and (4)
partial compliance based on local parity measures can induce ex-
treme segregation. Finally, we discuss implications for auditors and
insights concerning the design of regulatory frameworks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social andprofessional topics→Governmental regulations;
Socio-technical systems; • Applied computing → Law; Eco-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Responsible implementation of any allocation policy requires ro-
bust foresight about its likely impacts. In order to be useful, such
an analysis needs to take into account existing and emerging inter-
dependencies between the policy and environmental factors that
shape the policy’s long-term, situated consequences [22, 29]. How-
ever, to date, most studies of the performance and bias of algorithms
applied to allocation decisions examine the algorithm in isolation,
ignoring the wider deployment context. As a result, these anal-
yses risk distorting our understanding of the impacts of specific
algorithms, and limit our ability to anticipate broader societal im-
plications of algorithmic decision-making.
Recently, a more critical thread in algorithmic fairness scholar-
ship has called for a broader, systems-level approach to “fairness”,
recognizing that algorithmic decisions do not happen in a vacuum
[23, 27, 30, 32, 35, 41, 56]. Decisions may have long-term ramifica-
tions for individual welfare beyond the snapshot captured at the
time of prediction [19, 41]. Thus, shifting attention towards the
agency, impacts, and responsibility of decision makers in context is
imperative.
In this paper, we adopt such a systems-level approach to explore
the setting where multiple decision makers interact in a single labor
market. Rather than considering the fairness of policies that a single
decision maker might choose (i.e., the fairness of a single algorithm),
we assume that there are several decision makers, whose decisions
impact each another via market dynamics. While there are many
possible settings in which a multi-decision maker scenario could
take place—the provision of loans, for instance—we use the job
market as a toy model for this scenario, both for simplicity and to
set our work in dialogue with the broader labor economics literature
addressing discrimination and partial compliance.
Two factors complicate the situation. First, employers vary in
terms of their hiring policies, especially concerning their adherence
to fairness-promoting measures. This situation of partial compli-
ance reflects the current reality of predictive algorithms in hiring,
which is characterized by heterogeneity across vendors regarding
the type of measures, if any, enforced for counteracting bias [53].
Second, complicating matters further, differences in hiring policies
across institutions can incentivize strategic applications, altering
the distribution of candidates subsequently seen by employers [22].
We investigate these dynamics using simulation tools. Our mod-
els consist of two types of agents: applicants and employers. The
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applicants each have a single “score" reflecting their perceived skill
levels, and belong to one of two demographic groups: one which has
been historically disadvantaged, and associated with lower scores
on average, and one which has been historically advantaged, which
has higher scores on average. In this work, we take no position
on the extent to which this disparity is the result of systematic
biases in the appraisal of the disadvantaged group, or is an accurate
reflection of skills that vary because of upstream discrimination in
society. Our general observations apply in both cases.
The employers may either be fairness-conscious (compliant)—
taking into account considerations of demographic parity [13, 24],
or fairness-agnostic (non-compliant)—deciding solely on the basis
of scores. We also explore settings where applicants decide the
type of institutions to which they apply strategically in light of the
different incentives afforded by these selection policies.
We emphasize that our model is not intended as a realistic de-
piction of the labor market. We do not claim to offer direct policy
prescriptions. Instead, our purpose is to propose the simplest con-
ceivable model that captures the effects of partial compliance. By
elucidating some basic qualitative insights regarding the impacts of
partial compliance in allocative decisions, we aim to clarify the asso-
ciated set of concerns that must be accounted for by any regulator.
We argue that if even the most simple models evidence the complex
interactive effects introduced by partial compliance behavior, then
these effects must be considered when discussing the impact of
specific policies or algorithmic approaches.
Our findings. Even with the simplest of assumptions, the rela-
tionships between the number of compliant institutions and various
relevant metrics exhibit interesting phenomena:
(1) Partial compliance (by 𝑘% of employers) can result in far less
than proportional (𝑘%) progress towards the full compliance
outcomes.
(2) This gap (between the benefit of 𝑘% compliance and 𝑘%
of the benefit of full compliance) is wider when compliant
employers enforce demographic parity to match global (vs
local) statistics.
(3) Choices of global vs local statistics can paint dramatically
different pictures of the performance of compliant (versus
non-compliant) employers with respect to fairness consider-
ations.
(4) When coupled with incentive effects, partial compliance can
induce extreme segregation across institutions.
Our results illuminate a critical shortcoming in current approaches
to understanding fairness in algorithmic-based allocations, and
have significant implications for how we think about auditing de-
cision makers and assessing the potential benefits of regulation.
For example, simulations with our model show that even if a large
fraction of employers voluntarily comply with a fairness-promoting
policy, that does not necessarily mean that a commensurate frac-
tion of the benefit (relative to universal adoption) has been realized.
Consequently, a regulator assessing the urgency of implementing
fairness measure should take into account that even if only 20%
of the population are non-compliant with a particular voluntary
measure, they may be obstructing a much larger share, say 50% of
the possible benefits of the policy. Moreover, our findings suggest
that in order to understand an employer’s performance vis-a-vis
fairness desiderata, it is not enough to look at statistics calculated
based on the stream of candidates that apply to them—we must also
consider the way that the set of applicants that they encounter may
diverge from the demographics of the general population, and how
these dynamics involve both interactions among the employers and
strategic behavior among applicants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
survey literature from philosophy, (labor) economics, and the fair
machine learning community, making connections to other work
showing that the (partial) compliance among multiple decision
makers is an essential consideration for assessing both moral re-
sponsibility and implementing practical measures. In Section 3,
we introduce our model, including the parameters to our simula-
tion and several axes of variation that we explore. In Section 4, we
discuss our experiments and key results from those experiments.
Finally, Section 5 provides a more critical discussion, including
implications for regulating machine learning in allocative settings.
2 RELATEDWORK
This work builds on several lines of research in economics, fair
machine learning, political philosophy, and computational social
science. An extensive literature in economics models discrimination
in employment. Becker [10] introduced the notion of taste-based dis-
crimination, where employers’ distaste for hiring employees from a
certain group results in them behaving as though hiring a worker
from the marginalized group was associated with a higher cost (a
“disutility”), despite workers from both groups being identical in
terms of true skill level. Becker also shows that this differential treat-
ment among employers induces a sorting of minority employees
into the least discriminatory employers, with the equilibrium wage
determined by the disutility of the marginal discriminator. While
our setup and motivation differ from Becker’s, with employers
intervening to mitigate (rather than instigate) disparities, this seg-
regation effect induced by differential treatment across employers
also appears in our model.
Arrow et al. [5] famously criticized Becker’s model, arguing that
discrimination thus characterized would decrease competitiveness
and be driven out of the market, suggesting instead to focus on
models of discrimination driven by imperfect information. Along
these lines, Phelps [49] introduced a statistical model for discrim-
ination in hiring, whereby disparities emerge due to differences
in the difficulty of measuring the true skill level of each group of
employees. Aigner and Cain [1] build on this idea, arguing that
economic discrimination ought to be measured by differential treat-
ment conditioning on true skill. By contrast, we take no position
on whether observed scores accurately reflect the employee’s true
skill level. Finally, Coate and Loury [18] address the long-term
efficacy of affirmative-action policies, finding that, depending on
specific parameter settings in their model, affirmative action can
either eliminate stereotypes, or appear to confirm (untrue) negative
stereotypes. As our “fairness intervened" models are functionally
affirmative-action policies, we also explore the long-term dynamics
of such policies. By contrast, we focus on the impacts of many
employers adopting different policies on binary hiring decisions,
not on concerns regarding stereotypes or wages.
Paper Presentation AIES ’21, May 19–21, 2021, Virtual Event, USA
56
Fair Machine Learning Under Partial Compliance AIES ’21, May 19–21, 2021, Virtual Event, USA
Another related line of work calls for more realistic assumptions
about the social context of allocation [23, 32, 41, 56]. In the fair
machine learning literature, Hu and Chen [32] called attention to
dynamics of employer-employee interactions, modeling the labor
market as a series of principal-agent interactions. They draw upon
the same threads of the economics literature, but focus on repu-
tation and effort exertion. Liu et al. [41] focuses on credit ratings,
showing that with a simple but reasonable set of assumed dynamics,
certain fairness interventions can harm the very groups they are
intended to protect. Hardt et al. [30], Hu et al. [33], Kilbertus et al.
[37], Kleinberg and Raghavan [38], Milli et al. [44] all focus on the
strategic behavior of individuals subject to automated decisions. Hu
et al. [34] consider fairness in a setting where multiple classifiers
interact with one another in the same system. Finally, Rambachan
et al. [52] approaches fair machine learning from an economic per-
spective, constructing a social welfare function for a policymaker
and a private objective function for an algorithm designer, investi-
gating the relationship between disclosure and regulation. While
these works recognize the problem of framing decisions as classifi-
cations, none focus on partial compliance, the central issue in this
paper.
By contrast, we focus on two aspects of deployment dynamics
that, though critical in shaping the ethical impact of algorithms in
context, tend to be abstracted away in standard evaluations of algo-
rithmic systems. First, our model represents potential differences
among decision-makers in adherence to ethical or legal obligations,
thus relaxing the assumption of a central decision-maker (or, equiv-
alently, of full compliance), according to which all relevant agents
comply with what justice demands of them. Present in many philo-
sophical theories of justice and implicitly assumed by many works
in fair machine learning [23], the full compliance assumption en-
ables one to focus theorizing on the obligations that are the “fair
share” of any agent. Nonetheless, recent philosophical works have
cast doubt on whether theories developed under this assumption
can provide sufficient practical guidance for agents in the actual
world characterized by partial compliance [4, 62]. This line of work
considers when and how in circumstances of partial compliance
agents might face obligations that differ from what would have
been their fair share, had others complied [43, 55, 62]. In the related
labor economics literature, papers tend to focus on determining
the incentive structures that promote or impede compliance with
regulations such as minimum wage laws [6, 58], examining their
macro-level impacts on the treatment of “non-favored” groups [16].
Second, in our models, decision subjects are represented as
agents capable of responding strategically to the incentive structure
of the environment. While abstracted away in most analyses of
algorithmic reliability, this type of secondary effect is widespread
in real-world allocation settings, and achieving foresight about
its impacts is a priority for policy makers [22, 52]. Our work con-
tributes to emerging efforts in the fair machine learning literature
towards broadening the scope of analysis to include these effects
[19, 30, 42]. Moreover, in exploring the impact of these dynamics,
our work goes beyond assessments of algorithmic performance
in static settings, furthering research on the long-term impact of
proposed interventions [31, 32, 41].
We also build on recent research using simulation models to
study fairness in ML systems [19]. While comparatively new in fair
machine learning, simulation studies represent a core methodology
in economics and sociology [11, 15], and are increasingly used by
philosophers to study social dynamics in general [66] and fairness
in particular [45, 46]. Simulations are favored in these domains
owing to their ability to model emergent outcomes of multiple
interdependent decisions in non-stationary settings. Furthermore,
particularly in the presence of heterogeneity in individual charac-
teristics, simulations can yield insights that are not readily available
in traditional aggregate models, such as those based on closed form
solutions and/or systems of differential equations [36].
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We now provide a detailed description of the models explored in
our simulations and motivate their design. In all of our models of a
job market with partial compliance, all applicants have exactly two
attributes: (i) a score, representing perceived skill for the job; and (ii)
a group identity. Applicants may belong either to the advantaged
group with higher mean score (Group A) or the marginalized group
with lower mean score (Group B). Across our experiments, we
consider two levels of representation in the broader population: one
where the disadvantaged group constitutes 25% of the populations
and another where they constitute 50%. Our market contains a
number of employers (𝑛 = 50), 𝑘% of which may be compliant, and
(100 − 𝑘)% of which are non-compliant.
At each time step, some number of new applicants (𝑎 = 1250) en-
ter the jobmarket. Each newcomer to the applicant pool is randomly
assigned a group membership (according to population demograph-
ics). Each applicant’s score is drawn from a normal distribution:
N(0, 1) for Group A, and N(0,−0.3) for Group B. Then, every ap-
plicant chooses one employer to apply to, and each institution hires
ℎ = 10 applicants. Once hired, applicants are removed from the
market. Additionally, we remove applicants that have not been
hired after 10 rounds.
3.1 How do institutions choose applicants?
We consider three possible policies that institutions may adopt
when choosing applicants to hire: one generic non-compliant strat-
egy, and two possible fairness-conscious (i.e. “compliant”) strategies,
which satisfy some version of demographic parity.
(1) Generic policy. Non-compliant employers simply hire the ℎ
highest-scoring applicants.
(2) Global parity policy. Compliant employers with the global
parity policy satisfy demographic parity with their hires,
with respect to global demographics; this may or may not
be the same as the demographics of their applicant pool. For
example, if 25% of the population belonged to Group B, even
if they accounted for 35% of applicants to a global-parity
employer, they would only account for 25% of their hires.
(3) Local parity policy. Compliant employerswith the local parity
policy satisfy demographic parity with respect to the demo-
graphics of their applicant pool at that round; in most cases,
this is not the same as the overall demographics of the envi-
ronment. For example, if 15% of applicants to a local-parity
employer were from Group B, then 15% of the employer’s
hires will be from Group B, even if Group B comprises 25%
of the entire population.
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The latter two parity strategies are probabilistic—hiring 𝑥% from
Group B in expectation—rather than deterministically hiring a spe-
cific number from Group B based on a rounded proportion of avail-
able headcount. For simplicity, we only consider scenarios in which
all compliant employers adopt the same strategy (either local or
global).
Comments on demographic parity Our operationalization
of fairness in terms of demographic parity is not intended as an
endorsement of this measure as the appropriate fairness measure in
hiring settings. Rather, our choice is based on the widespread use
of the measure in current practice [53], perhaps due to a perceived
connection between the quantitative measure and disparate im-
pact doctrine in the United States [24] and indirect discrimination
regulations in the European Union [2]1.
Additionally, if available scores accurately reflect “true” skill
level, then the generic, non-compliant policy may actually be fair
according to to some proposed definitions of fairness, such as cali-
bration [50].While our results are relevant regardless of the relation-
ship between “true” and available scores, making this assumption
means that our work can be also be re-interpreted as investigat-
ing the scenario where many intentionally- compliant employers
have different interpretations of compliance—that is, employers are
satisfying different definitions of fairness.
In the case that available scores do not accurately reflect “true”
skill level for Group B, consider a setting where the true skill distri-
butions are identical, and the compliant policy involves correction
for the score difference rather than setting explicit headcounts.
More concretely, the score-correcting compliant policy will simply
add the known difference in scores to the scores of all applicants
from Group B, then hire the ℎ applicants with the highest (cor-
rected) scores regardless of group membership—operationalizing
fairness as treating individuals with the same true skill equally. As
it turns out, this setting yields identical results to the local parity
policy: for any given set of applications, a local parity employer
will hire the top 𝑥% of applicants from each group. Meanwhile, a
score-correcting employer corrects the scores of Group B, so that
both groups have the exact same score distributions. Then, hiring
the top 𝑥% based on corrected scores is equivalent to hiring the top
𝑥% from each group. However, we note that the two may diverge
when applicants’ strategic behavior can be score aware.
Finally, we note that both possible compliant policies—local and
global—are constrained by the demographics of the applicant pool,
even in the global parity case: for example, 25% of Group B among
all applicants may still reflect under-representation with respect to
the entire population, which means that even a “global parity” em-
ployer only satisfies demographic parity with respect to the overall
applicant pool, rather than the true global population demographics.
3.2 How do applicants choose institutions?
We also consider three possible strategies that applicants may em-
ploy when choosing institutions to apply to. Let 𝑝𝐺 ∈𝐴,𝐵 represent
1See Lipton and Steinhardt [40] and Wachter et al. [63] for critical perspectives on the
connection.
the probability of an applicant from group G (either A or B) choos-
ing to apply to a compliant institution, scaled by the total number of
compliant institutions. Like the employer policies, these strategies
are stochastic.
(1) Completely at random. All applicants from both groups are
equally likely to apply to institutions of either type; hence,
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑘 . This reflects no strategic behavior, i.e., appli-
cants have no sensitivity to incentives.
(2) Static preference. Over the course of the simulation, all appli-
cants from Group A have a fixed preference for applying to
a non-compliant institution, and all applicants from Group
B have a fixed preference for applying to a compliant insti-
tution; hence, 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑘 < 𝑝𝐵 . This reflects strategic behavior,
where applicants have some knowledge about the nature of
each institution’s policies, but no access to additional infor-
mation over the course of the simulation—that is, applicants
are sensitive to incentives but have limited knowledge of the
system.
(3) Dynamic preference. Over the course of the simulation, 𝑝𝐴
and 𝑝𝐵 are adjusted for each round based on the results of the
previous round. For each group, if that group’s acceptance
rate in compliant institutions is greater than its acceptance
rate in non-compliant institutions, then the log odds ratio
ln(𝑝𝐺/(1 − 𝑝𝐺 )) is increased by a constant amount 0.05. Oth-
erwise, it is decreased by the same amount. Equilibrium for
each group is reached when the probability of being accepted
at a parity institution is the same as the probability of be-
ing accepted at a generic institution. This reflects strategic
behavior where applicants are aware of their group mem-
bership, have access to new information at each timestep,
and are able to update their strategy accordingly.
Comments on applicant strategy and agent-based modeling
While we do not claim that these strategies exactly model the deci-
sion making processes of individuals in the real world, these coarse
approximations of aggregate behavior yield valuable qualitative
insights. Though we use a simple toy model, the core motivations
for its design are grounded in reality. The hiring platform Applied,
for example, claims that fairness-conscious hiring policies result in
increased applications from minority groups [9]. It is impossible
to exactly quantify the degree to which either applicant strategy
(static or dynamic) represents “true” behavior. However, as men-
tioned in Section 2, simulation studies are a core methodology in
both economics and philosophy, and in this work, the value of sim-
ulation is to test the qualitative impact of some sort of applicant
strategy.
4 RESULTS
In all of our experiments, we vary the number of compliant institu-
tions (out of 50 total) from 0 to 50. For each number of compliant
institutions, we run ten trials of the simulation. For each trial, we
run the simulation until it reaches equilibrium: 100 steps for static
applicant strategy, and 200 steps for adaptive applicant strategy.
We then continue running the simulation for the same number of
additional timesteps and calculate statistics from each trial based on
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Figure 1: Benefit as measured by demographic parity for different institution policies. Far left plots show market where all
applicants pick employers uniformly at random; as expected, we see exactly linear gain. In the center column, applicants have
a slight preference for a more favorable employer (compliant for Group B, non-compliant for group A), and in the far right
plots, applicants have an adaptive strategy.
the post-equilibrium timesteps. In all of our plots, one dot reflects
the statistics calculated from a single trial.
Sublinear gain Our first key finding is that when employees
apply strategically, then under partial compliance, the aggregate
benefit from an additional compliant employer depends strongly
on how many institutions are already compliant. In Figure 1, all
employees apply with the strategy of static preference: that is,
knowing that compliant employers are more likely to hire Group
B applicants, and that non-compliant employers are more likely
to hire Group A applicants, employees from Group B apply to
compliant employers with probability 0.55 (scaled by number of
each type of employer) and employees from group A apply to non-
compliant employers with probability 0.55. The y-axis is scaled
demographic parity, where 𝑦 = 0 corresponds to the disparate
impact score 𝑃 (hired |𝐵)
𝑃 (hired |𝐴) when all employers are non-compliant (with
our main experimental parameters, this is approximately 0.75),
and 𝑦 = 1 corresponds to “perfect" parity. One might hope that
𝑘% compliance would correspond to at least 𝑘% of the benefits, a
condition that we denote linear gain. In Figures 1 and 2, this is
illustrated by the light peach line.
Notably, when all compliant institutions satisfy fairness with
respect to global statistics, the partial compliance curve is convex,
illustrating sublinear gain—𝑘% compliance always gives less than
𝑘% of the attainable benefit. Perhaps this should not be a surprising
result. The baseline demographic parity (% benefit = 0, at 0% com-
pliance) reflects a scenario where each (non-compliant) employer
receives an applicant pool that reflects the overall demographics
of the system (i.e., if 25% of all applicants in the system are from
Group B, then on average 25% of non-compliant employers’ ap-
plicants also are from Group B). In order for linear gain to occur,
then at 𝑘% compliance, all (100 − 𝑘)% non-compliant employers
must hire at the same rate as they were at 0% compliance even as
the 𝑘% compliant employers hire exactly in accordance with global
demographic parity. However, due to applicant strategy, the distri-
bution of applicants to non-compliant employers at 𝑘% compliance
no longer reflects the demographics of the system. Instead, non-
compliant employers see relatively more Group A applicants and
relatively fewer Group B applicants. As a result, the non-compliant
hiring strategy results in an even lower percentage of Group B (as
a proportion of overall hires) than at 0% compliance, giving rise to
sublinear gain.
Under local parity policies, the partial compliance curve can
actually reflect superlinear gain, as when Group B constitutes 25%
of the population. However, when Group B constitutes 50% of the
population (Figure 2), these dynamics change: local parity policies
now also induce sublinear gain, and the global parity curve indicates
a more pronounced sublinear gain.
Regardless of whether Group B comprises 25% or 50% of the pop-
ulation, following the global parity policy leads to comparatively
worse gains than following the local parity policy—that is, for any
given 𝑘% compliant institutions, the percent benefit when employ-
ers satisfy global parity is lower than when employers satisfy local
parity. The explanation, both for super/sub-linearity of local parity
policies, and for why sublinear gain under global parity is always
worse than under local parity, lies in the flexibility that a local parity
policy affords. Under global parity policies, the fraction of hires
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that a compliant institution can make from Group B is fixed based
on their share of the underlying population. However, with local
parity policy, it is possible for all 𝑘% of the compliant employers to
allocate their entire headcount to Group B (in the event that Group
B comes to represent 100% of their applicants). Thus, under local
parity, compliant employers are able to take on more than their
“fair share” (to borrow terminology from the philosophy literature
on partial compliance).
Figure 2: Aggregate statisticswhenGroupB is 50% of the pop-
ulation; benefit is measured by overall demographic parity.
Left: static applicant strategy; right: adaptive applicant strat-
egy.
Static vs adaptive applicant strategy When employees are
able to update their application strategy at each timestep, inter-
esting dynamics emerge (Figure 1, 2). Recall that the likelihood of
employees from a given group applying to each type of employer
(compliant vs non-compliant) is adjusted based on group-wise ac-
ceptance rates from the previous timestep. Hence, equilibrium for
each group is reached when that group encounters the same ac-
ceptance rate from both compliant and non-compliant employers.
Under global parity policies, the first 80% of compliant institutions
are only able to push the macro-level statistics around halfway to
parity; the remaining 50% of benefits relies entirely on the last 20%
of employers becoming compliant. Interestingly, under local parity
policies when Group B is 25% of the population, the first 20% of
compliant employers have functionally no effect on the macro-level
view of fairness, while complete parity is achieved by the time
around 30% of employers are compliant. For intuition as to why
this is the case, we can look at the equilibrium probabilities for
applying to either type of employer. Figure 3 shows that under local
parity policies, the equilibrium 𝑝𝐵 (probability of applying to a com-
pliant employer for Group B) quickly goes to 1. With 20% or more
compliant employers, Group B always applies almost exclusively to
compliant institutions. Meanwhile, until 26% or more employers are
compliant, Group A applies almost exclusively to non-compliant
Figure 3: Groupwise equilibrium probability (𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 de-
scribed in Section 3) of applying to either compliant or
non-compliant employers, under adaptive applicant strat-
egy. The orange line indicates the 𝑝 reflecting no prefer-
ence (i.e. probability determined solely by the proportion of
compliant institutions currently in the system, 𝑝 = 𝑘). Left:
global parity policy; right: local parity policy.
institutions. Under global parity policies, the difference in prefer-
ence induced by partial adoption of the fairness-promoting policy
is less severe.
The emergent demographic composition of institutions A
closer look at institution-specific outcomes reveals that at equi-
librium, strategic applications can result in homogeneity within
institutions and segregation across institutions. In the case of global
parity policies, the dramatic increase in aggregate parity (Figure
1, right column) is coupled with a precipitous drop-off in the per-
centage of hired applicants belonging to Group B in non-compliant
institutions (Figure 4, bottom left). The situation is even more dire
under local parity policies, as the the equilibrium strategies mean
that non-compliant institutions have no hired applicants (or indeed,
applications) from members of Group B (Figure 4, bottom right).
Notably, though the aggregate parity curves under the global policy
do not look so different in Figure 1, the segregation effects do not
occur when applicants operate under a static application strategy:
while partial compliance has some impact on the overall demo-
graphic composition of hired employees, the percentage of Group
B never approaches zero (Figure 4, top row).
The impact of the original demographic makeup on adap-
tive applicant strategy When employees were applying to
firms under a static strategy, the impact of changing from a sce-
nario where Group B is 25% of the population (Figure 1) to one
where Group B is 50% of the population (Figure 2), while signif-
icant, affects aggregate statistics in similar ways at all levels of
compliance and for both global and local parity policies. However,
when applicant strategies are adaptive, increasing the proportion of
Group B in the population (Figure 2) means that under global parity
policies, the first 80% of compliant institutions—despite reaching
50% of the benefit when Group B was 25% of the population (Figure
1)—actually have no impact on aggregate demographic parity. The
critical tipping point, however, remains the same, at 80% compli-
ance. Under local parity policies, on the other hand, the overall
shape of the aggregate parity curve remains the same—two large re-
gions with either zero or perfect parity, and one small intermediary
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Figure 4: Demographic composition among hired employees, by institution type—in these graphs, GroupB is 25% of the popula-
tion. Top row: Applicants employ a static strategy. Bottom row: applicants employ an adaptive strategy. Light green horizontal
line indicates percentage of Group B in population.
transition region—but when Group B comprises 50% of the popula-
tion, the critical transition region is between 40%-50% compliance,
rather than 20%-30% compliance.
5 DISCUSSION
Our simulations illustrate several fundamental but commonly over-
looked issues that plague the ethical evaluation and governance of
algorithmic tools in consequential allocation settings. While our
results do not imply specific or prescriptive policy solutions, they
do raise critical questions about the design and adoption of fair
policies.
Beyond narrow assessments of fairness: diversity and inte-
gration Consider first that, in many allocative contexts, task-
related utility and fairness are not the only desiderata. For example,
in hiring contexts, diversity within the workforce is intrinsically
valuable, both due to its potential to enhance team performance
and on moral and political grounds [47, 59]. While recent work
in fair ML has begun to consider the interaction between diver-
sity, utility and fairness [14, 21], most analyses remain restricted to
static settings, focused on individual decision-makers, neglecting
the interactions among their decisions and those of their peers
and the influence of dynamic factors, such as incentive effects, on
long-term policy consequences. Consider what Steel et al. [60] refer
to as the representative concept of diversity (see also Smith-Doerr
et al. [57]), motivated by concerns about democratic legitimacy,
which requires the distributional properties of the selected group
to match those of the general population. The global demographic
parity measure thus tracks this notion of diversity. Viewed through
a static lens, and setting aside the influence of incentives on the
choice behavior of applicants, the same connection could be said to
hold between the diversity concept and local demographic parity
measures. Indeed, this has led some authors to roughly equate these
notions of diversity and fairness [14]. The situation becomes more
complicated, however, once the dynamics of adaptive application
are taken into account. Here, the appearance of (ostensibly desir-
able) parity at the aggregate level conceals the detrimental impact
of local parity policies on diversity within the workforces of the
individual employers. These outcomes can emerge absent any ex-
plicit desire for segregation on the part of applicants or employers;
rather, they are a consequence of the dynamics of incentive effects
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Figure 5: Percent hired per group per institution type. Group
B is 25% of the overall population.
under partial compliance. In addition to stripping institutions of the
benefits of diversity, the resulting segregation can exacerbate the
homophily-based processes that, according to a number of authors
[3, 46], can cultivate or amplify injustice.
The aims and the value-alignment of regulation The above
discussion indicates the urgent need to clarify the aims and value
orientation of regulation. As Rambachan et al. [52] note, many
discussions of regulation related to algorithmic fairness are fun-
damentally concerned with selecting a policy that will generate
an optimal distribution of outcomes. Naturally, this requires first
deciding what constitutes the optimal outcome distribution.
It is useful to frame this issue by inquiring about the aims of
the policy that might support the enforcement of local (vs global)
demographic parity. In practice, demographic parity is popular,
perhaps owing to the 80% rule, which is sometimes invoked as a
statistical test in the first phase of disparate impact cases [24]. Note,
however, that this connection does not provide a blind endorsement
of this form of parity as that which ought to be enforced. Certainly,
demographic parity can be a part of a diagnostic toolbox, serving
to indicate disparities that could, but need not, indicate underlying
discrimination [8, 39]. When precisely measured, demographic
disparity can signal moral or legal failings with that particular
employer which lie outside the narrow scope of the quantitative
measure itself. However, even when the disparity is a symptom of
underlying ethical troubles with an allocation policy, enforcing the
measure may be a misguided remedy to addressing these troubles
(e.g., when the trouble lies with the choice of target outcomes or
labels).
Another way of motivating the enforcement of (some form of)
demographic parity is by reference to an employer’s wish to im-
plement affirmative action. That is, employers may wish to enforce
demographic parity, and so preferentially select applicants on the
basis of their group membership, as a means of complying with a
moral obligation to increase the representation of historically disad-
vantaged social groups in their institutions. This interpretation res-
onates with the suggestions that, in some cases, the use of measures
such as demographic parity is motivated by the “long-term societal
goal” of living in a society where protected attributes are indepen-
dent of task-relevant outcomes [7]. However, specifying the relation
between demographic parity and affirmative action requires clarity
about the underlying aim and justifications of the latter—issues
that vary radically across different models of affirmative actions
[3]—and considerations of whether the former indeed serves those
aims. Crucially, our results indicate that, even with minimal incor-
poration of deployment dynamics, the (partial) adoption of local
demographic parity is inconsistent with prominent future-oriented
justifications of affirmative action. In particular, the emergence of
between-institute segregation and a lack of within-institute diver-
sity in our simulations indicate that partial compliance with the
measure can result in significant conflicts with diversity-based [25]
and integration-based [3] arguments for affirmative action.
Of course, one could adopt a different model of affirmative action
to motivate the enforcement of demographic parity. For instance,
depending on the interpretation of scores in our model (e.g., as a
result of past, upstream injustices, or as an outcome of ongoing
biases in an employer’s hiring practices), the measure could be
connected to compensation-based [61] or discrimination-offsetting
[64] justifications. Each of these models faces its own set of chal-
lenges, including discordance with the actual practice of law, failure
to account for the weight given to social categories in preferential
selection, engendering the expressive harm of stigmatization, and
undermining the societal legitimacy of affirmative action [3, 25].
While adjudicating between different models of affirmative ac-
tion is beyond the scope of this paper, it raises an important concern:
Decisions about the aims and the alignment of regulation are value-
laden to their core. As a result, these decisions should be made
transparently, and on the basis of an integrated consideration of the
relevant moral and political models. Importantly, our results show
that individual efforts (or the lack thereof) to promote fairness can
remain out of sight unless assessed through a more comprehensive,
dynamic lens. Analyses of the kind carried out in this paper can not
only bring these value judgments into the open, but also comple-
ment theorizing about which moral and political models we should
prefer, and why. For example, analyses of deployment dynamics
can offer qualitative insights about other meaningful endpoints
and value-relevant considerations (e.g., diversity) that are likely to
be relevant to assessing the desirability of alternative policies in
context. Such approaches can thus contribute to recent calls for
enriching the evaluation of downstream impacts of algorithmic
decision-making [48]. Viewed from this perspective, far from sim-
ply being a burden to be neglected in the context of ethical design,
assessment of deployment dynamics can guide our deliberations in
such contexts.
Partial compliance and the design of appropriate auditing
frameworks The type of partial compliance explored in this
paper is a simple representation of the kinds of heterogeneity that
exist in the adoption of fairness-promoting measures among vari-
ous employers both in the use of algorithmic tools in hiring [53]
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and in hiring more generally. The varied choices of measures is
a consequence of the ambiguity of current regulatory frameworks.
Indeed, the laxity of constraints provides even the non-compliant
employers in our simulations with a claim to fairness. That is, in-
sofar as these employers have access to the “ground truths” for
skill scores, they can be seen as employing a perfect predictor that
satisfies a number of other fairness desiderata suggested in the
literature, such as parities in sensitivity, specificity, and precision
across groups [17, 20]. Similar to the evaluative practices that in-
form them, these regulatory frameworks appear to be based on
unrealistic assumptions and abstractions of the problem domain.
Our exploration of the dynamics of partial compliance raises
central concerns that should inform judgments about both the need
for regulation and the form that it should take. The discussion
above relies heavily on the assumption that a regulator would be
able to bring about something approximating full compliance to
begin with. Determining how the behavior of individual decision
makers compares to the behavior of all decision makers—and by
extension, whether partial compliance is occurring—is therefore a
critical concern forany regulatory regime.
Existing approaches to auditing have focused on examining the
performance of a single algorithmic decision maker [26, 51, 54].
Similarly,Wilson et al. [65]’s workwith Pymetrics, a hiring platform
that uses local demographic parity, explicitly considers only the
pool of applicants that Pymetrics receives, seeking to verify the
extent to which the selection procedure adheres to this version of
demographic parity. 2
However, in addition to highlighting the potential cost to di-
versity and integration, our analysis shows that fairness statistics
reported by each employer are impacted not only by their poli-
cies, but also by those of their competitors. In our simulation, at
equilibrium under partial compliance, when employers adopt the
global parity policy, an auditor looking at the fractions of applicants
from Group A and Group B hired might erroneously conclude that
compliant and non-compliant employers were behaving similarly
(Figure 5). However, this mistaken view fails to account for the
incentive effects, whereby compliant employers come to receive
many more applications from members of the disadvantaged group.
Thus, when auditing performance vis-a-vis ethical desiderata, we
may not be able to determine how a firm is performing without
also evaluating their peers.
Phenomena of this sort are not exclusive to partial compliance
settings. D’Amour et al. [19], which study the long-term impact of
(fair) decisions, find a similar instance of Simpson’s paradox where
enforcing equal opportunity at each point in time does not result in
equal opportunity in the aggregate, in the presence of interactive ef-
fects between decisions and the characteristics of decision subjects.
Taken together, these results suggest a need for auditors to investi-
gate not only the distributions of outcomes given the data, but the
actual underlying policy. To this end, Rambachan et al. [52], who
study the construction of ideal (fair) policy from the perspective of
a regulator, find a particularly interesting result: the ideal disclo-
sure regime is one where individual decision makers must disclose
2Our emphasis here is on the fact that the audit is solely focused on Pymetrics, not
to claim that Pymetrics functions as a decision maker in the same way as employers
do in our simulation. Additional discussion of the Pymetrics audit’s coverage, while
merited, is out of scope for this work.
all information about their algorithm and decision rule, and the
effectiveness of regulation is substantially diluted when disclosure
is more limited. Finally, although the downstream consequences of
regulation in a dynamic environment is beyond the scope of this
work, viewing regulation under a dynamic lens suggests that the
potential for partial compliance to mask the efforts of compliant
institutions may provide an incentive for those institutions to share
information about their policies with auditors despite the desire to
protect proprietary information, because it may help differentiate
themselves from non-compliant institutions.
In some sense, the abstractions in our model underestimate the
implications of partial compliance for current regulatory and eval-
uative practices. This is because our model represents partial com-
pliance only with respect to concurrent policies in a competitive
marketplace of hiring. That is, we do not consider allocations that
are upstream (e.g., in education) and downstream (e.g., promotion,
mobility across work sector, banking) from hiring decisions, each
made by decision-makers who may or may not adhere to their legal
(or moral) obligations.
Elster [22] makes vivid the significance of such allocations for
the well-being and opportunities of individuals:
The life chances of the citizen in modern societies ...
depend on allocations made by relatively autonomous
institutions, beginning with admission or nonadmis-
sion to nursery school and ending with admission or
nonadmission to nursing homes. One could write the
fictional biography of a typical citizen, to depict his
life as shaped by successive encounters with institu-
tions that have the power to accord or deny him the
scarce goods that he seeks [22, p. 2].
Despite the potential of unexpected outcome due to robust cou-
plings between policies at successive allocative settings, the impli-
cations of partial compliance at successive stages remain under-
investigated by the fair ML community. This is a challenge that
requires a concerted interdisciplinary effort by the community. In-
deed, providing practical guidance under partial compliance poses
a challenge to traditional frameworks of distributive justice in po-
litical philosophy. While looking to these frameworks for robust
conceptual underpinnings of fairness measures can be fruitful [12],
they were mainly concerned with modeling the re-distributive obli-
gations of a nation state towards its citizens from the perspective of
economic justice. However, when our focus is to provide guidance
to relatively autonomous decision-makers using ML tools in local
allocative settings, we can no longer simply operate with the same
assumptions. Responsible innovation in general [28] and ethical de-
ployment of algorithmic-based decision-making in particular [23]
require more comprehensive foresight studies that are equipped to
deal with the complexities of the deployment context. We hope that
our work contributes a few preliminary steps towards this aim.
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